ABSTRACT

Is it possible that there are extended simples—material objects extended in space or spacetime that have no proper parts? The most commonly cited argument for this possibility is based on a version of the Humean principle: namely (and with some qualifications), any pattern of instantiation of a fundamental relation is possible. In this paper, we make the Humean argument fully explicit, and criticise it from three aspects—the Disjunction problem, the Pluralist problem, and the Accidentality problem. First, the original argument only shows a disjunctive thesis: either extended simples are possible, or unextended complexes are possible. In order to reach the desired conclusion, some additional premise is needed. Yet, even though we agree that the Disjunction problem can be met, we argue that the Humean argument fails to establish the possibility of extended simples, for two reasons: the first comes from compositional pluralism, and the second is about the definition of accidental properties. We contend that the latter two problems put the proponents of the Humean argument in serious difficulty. Thus, metaphysicians who hold that there are extended simples should find better arguments for this view.

摘要

有没有可能存在扩展单形——在空间或时空中扩展但没有适当部分的物质对象？这种可能性最常被引用的论点是基于休谟原则的一个版本: 即（并且有一些条件），基本关系的任何实例化模式都是可能的。在本文中，我们将休谟论证充分阐明，并从析取问题、多元论问题和偶然性问题三个方面对其进行批判。首先，最初的论点只显示了一个析取论点：扩展的简单词是可能的，或者未扩展的复合词是可能的。为了达到预期的结论，需要一些额外的前提。然而，尽管我们同意析取问题可以得到解决，但我们认为休谟论证未能建立扩展单形的可能性，原因有两个：第一个来自复合多元主义，第二个是关于偶然属性的定义. 我们认为后两个问题使休谟论的支持者陷入了严重的困境。因此，认为存在扩展单形的形而上学家应该为这种观点找到更好的论据。