For all that digital methods—including network visualization, text analysis, and others—have begun to show extensive promise in philosophical contexts, a tension remains between two uses of those tools that have often been taken to be incompatible, or at least to engage in a kind of trade-off: the discovery of new hypotheses and the testing of already-formulated positions. This paper presents this basic distinction, then explores ways to resolve this tension with the help of two interdisciplinary case studies, taken from preregistration in contemporary science and the debate over whig history in the history of science. These case studies, the paper argues, refocus our attention from a mutually exclusive testing/discovery binary to the relationship between our background data or philosophical views and the empirical generalizations that we might draw from the data. Finally, it develops a set of three challenges for philosophers and corresponding avenues for future work that will, it is hoped, allow us to better justify our use of these methods.

中文翻译：

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测试与发现：应对数字科学哲学的挑战

尽管所有数字方法——包括网络可视化、文本分析和其他方法——已经开始在哲学背景下显示出广泛的前景，但这些工具的两种用途之间仍然存在紧张关系，这些工具通常被认为是不兼容的，或者至少是不兼容的。一种权衡：发现新假设和检验已经制定的立场。本文介绍了这一基本区别，然后借助两个跨学科案例研究探讨了解决这种紧张关系的方法，这些案例研究取自当代科学的预注册和科学史上关于辉格党历史的辩论。论文认为，这些案例研究，将我们的注意力从相互排斥的测试/发现二进制文件重新集中到我们的背景数据或哲学观点与我们可能从数据中得出的经验概括之间的关系。最后，它为哲学家提出了三个挑战，并为未来的工作提出了相应的途径，希望能够让我们更好地证明我们使用这些方法的合理性。