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Designing Hybrid Mechanisms to Overcome Congestion in Sequential Dutch Auctions
MIS Quarterly ( IF 7.3 ) Pub Date : 2022-03-01 , DOI: 10.25300/misq/2022/16472
Yixin Lu , , Alok Gupta , Wolfgang Ketter , Eric van Heck , , , ,

A common problem in many mature markets is how to deal with congestion—a situation in which transaction requests from market participants cannot be accommodated in an expedited manner. This paper examines the congestion problem in sequential Dutch auction markets. Transactions in these markets typically involve perishable goods, thus market clearing speed is crucial. Traditionally, sequential Dutch auctions are implemented with fast-paced auction clocks that process equally attractive bids in the order they arrive and only award the first bidder as the winner in each round. This could lead to serious congestion in case of demand surge. We propose a hybrid mechanism that capitalizes on the discrete nature of the auction clock and batches together the highest bids, allowing multiple transactions at the same price in each round. To evaluate the performance of the hybrid mechanism, we first develop a game-theoretic model comparing the hybrid mechanism to the traditional sequential Dutch auction mechanism. Our model predicts the hybrid mechanism will achieve higher operational efficiency without compromising allocative efficiency. We then complement the theoretical analysis by evaluating the hybrid mechanism through a quasi-natural field experiment. The empirical analysis of the field data shows that the hybrid mechanism can significantly speed up the market clearing process and increase price stability without affecting the expected revenue. Our findings shed new light on the design and operation of multi-unit auctions.

中文翻译:

设计混合机制以克服连续荷兰式拍卖中的拥塞

许多成熟市场的一个共同问题是如何处理拥塞——市场参与者的交易请求无法得到快速响应的情况。本文研究了连续荷兰式拍卖市场的拥堵问题。这些市场的交易通常涉及易腐烂的商品,因此市场出清速度至关重要。传统上,顺序荷兰式拍卖是通过快节奏的拍卖时钟实施的,该时钟按到达的顺序处理同样有吸引力的出价,并且只将第一个投标人作为每轮的获胜者。如果需求激增,这可能会导致严重的拥堵。我们提出了一种混合机制,该机制利用拍卖时钟的离散性并将最高出价分批在一起,从而允许在每一轮中以相同的价格进行多笔交易。为了评估混合机制的性能,我们首先开发了一个博弈论模型,将混合机制与传统的顺序荷兰式拍卖机制进行了比较。我们的模型预测混合机制将在不影响分配效率的情况下实现更高的运营效率。然后,我们通过准自然现场实验评估混合机制来补充理论分析。现场数据的实证分析表明,混合机制可以在不影响预期收益的情况下显着加快市场出清进程,提高价格稳定性。我们的发现为多单元拍卖的设计和运作提供了新的启示。我们的模型预测混合机制将在不影响分配效率的情况下实现更高的运营效率。然后,我们通过准自然现场实验评估混合机制来补充理论分析。现场数据的实证分析表明,混合机制可以在不影响预期收益的情况下显着加快市场出清进程,提高价格稳定性。我们的发现为多单元拍卖的设计和运作提供了新的启示。我们的模型预测混合机制将在不影响分配效率的情况下实现更高的运营效率。然后,我们通过准自然现场实验评估混合机制来补充理论分析。现场数据的实证分析表明,混合机制可以在不影响预期收益的情况下显着加快市场出清进程,提高价格稳定性。我们的发现为多单元拍卖的设计和运作提供了新的启示。现场数据的实证分析表明,混合机制可以在不影响预期收益的情况下显着加快市场出清进程,提高价格稳定性。我们的发现为多单元拍卖的设计和运作提供了新的启示。现场数据的实证分析表明,混合机制可以在不影响预期收益的情况下显着加快市场出清进程,提高价格稳定性。我们的发现为多单元拍卖的设计和运作提供了新的启示。
更新日期:2022-03-01
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