Federal and state law enforcement interceptions of communications, as authorized by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and analogous state laws, are contingent on obtaining a court order. We investigate how wiretap orders have been utilized in narcotics cases across the federal and state court systems. We characterize a sorting mechanism that is consistent with our data and empirical findings, whereby federal wiretap orders trade off prosecution outcomes and crime deterrence more quickly than state wiretap orders. We also find that the intensity of surveillance in most states and years is at the lower end of the enforcement-deterrence trade-off, reflecting the high cost of running wiretap operations.

根据《电子通信隐私法》和类似的州法律的授权，联邦和州执法部门对通信的拦截取决于获得法院命令。我们调查了联邦和州法院系统如何在毒品案件中使用窃听令。我们描述了一种与我们的数据和实证结果一致的排序机制，即联邦窃听令比州窃听令更快地权衡起诉结果和犯罪威慑。我们还发现，大多数州和年份的监视强度处于执法-威慑权衡的低端，这反映了窃听行动的高成本。