I reconstruct the notion of significance [Sinnhaftigkeit] in the later Husserl, with attention to his conceptions of judgment and transcendental logic. My analysis is motivated by the idea that an account of significance can help to connect analytic, Anglo-American conceptions of meaning as a precise, law-governed phenomenon investigated via linguistic analysis and Continental European conceptions of meaning in a broader “existential” sense. I argue that Husserl’s later work points to a transcendental-logical conception of a founding level of significance [Sinnhaftigkeit] prior to language, and that this conception meets characteristically analytic demands for precision and governance by logical constraints. At the same time, since it is based in descriptions of perceptual intentionality at the level of essential possibility, it leaves room for an account of meaning as a partially undetermined phenomenon of lived experience, and not just of our language and concepts, and thereby meets the characteristically Continental demand to take at face value meaning’s vagueness and indeterminacy in everyday human life.

我重构了晚期胡塞尔的意义概念[ Sinnhaftigkeit ]，关注他的判断和先验逻辑概念。我的分析的动机是，对意义的解释有助于将分析性的、英美意义的概念（作为一种通过语言分析研究的精确的、受法律管辖的现象）与更广泛的“存在”意义上的欧洲大陆的意义概念联系起来。我认为胡塞尔后来的著作指出了一种先验逻辑概念，即先于语言建立的意义水平[ Sinnhaftigkeit ]，并且这一概念满足了对精确性和逻辑约束治理的典型分析要求。同时，由于它基于对基本可能性水平上的感知意向性的描述，因此它为将意义解释为生活经验中部分未确定的现象而不仅仅是我们的语言和概念留下了空间，从而满足典型的欧洲大陆要求从表面上理解人类日常生活中意义的模糊性和不确定性。