In this paper I present an account of the rational abilities that make our decisions free. Following the lead of new dispositionalists, a leeway account of free decisions is developed, and the rational abilities that ground our abilities to decide otherwise are described in detail. A main result will be that the best account of the relevant rational abilities makes them two-way abilities: abilities to decide to do or not to do x in accordance with one’s apparent reasons. Dispositionalism about rational abilities will be vindicated, since it helps to see why and how these two-way abilities entail an ability to decide otherwise and, thus, free will.

中文翻译：

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用理性能力解释自由意志

在本文中，我介绍了使我们的决策自由的理性能力。在新的倾向主义者的领导下，对自由决定的余地描述得到了发展，并详细描述了我们做出其他决定的能力的理性能力。一个主要的结果是，对相关理性能力的最佳描述使它们成为双向能力：根据一个人明显的理由决定做或不做 x 的能力。关于理性能力的倾向主义将被证明是正确的，因为它有助于了解为什么以及如何这些双向能力需要做出其他决定的能力，从而产生自由意志。