ABSTRACT

This paper examines how credit rating agencies affect audit fee. We find robust evidence that the coverage of investor-paid rating agency increases audit fee. The coverage of investor-paid rating agency increases bad news disclosure and makes the tone of media reports on the firm more negative. Auditors get informed and more aware of the firm’s risk, resulting in higher audit fee. Our findings suggest that the monitoring roles of auditors and credit rating agencies are complementary to each other. The cross-sectional analyses suggest that the effect of investor-paid rating agency on audit fee is more prominent for firms with high risk and poor corporate governance. To sum up, the coverage of investor-paid rating agency has a spillover effect on other participants in capital markets.

摘要

本文研究了信用评级机构如何影响审计费用。我们发现强有力的证据表明投资者支付评级机构的覆盖范围增加了审计费用。投资者付费评级机构的报道增加了坏消息的披露，使媒体对公司的报道基调更加负面。审计师获得信息并更加了解公司的风险，从而导致更高的审计费用。我们的研究结果表明，审计师和信用评级机构的监督角色是相辅相成的。横断面分析表明，投资者支付评级机构对审计费用的影响在高风险和公司治理较差的公司中更为突出。综上所述，投资者付费评级机构的覆盖范围对资本市场的其他参与者具有溢出效应。