We hypothesize that people can use the extremity of their moral intuitions—the extent to which something feels moral versus immoral—to make functional social inferences that signal inner character, benefit individual welfare, bind groups together, and teach normative behavior. We find strong support for this hypotheses across four preregistered studies (N = 1224). Our measure of these social functions has four reliable, distinct dimensions that map onto signaling, benefiting, binding, and teaching (Studies 1–3). These social functions uniquely predict judgments of morality and immorality across a wide variety of moral contexts (Study 1), and experimentally manipulating the operation of these social functions causes stronger moral judgments (Study 4). Critically, an experimental manipulation of moral extremity—in which participants write about their own recalled (Study 2) or hypothetical (Study 3) moral event of varying severity—causes stronger inferences about these social functions. Aggregate analyses provide complementary support these hypotheses. Finally, we discuss how morality facilitates life in groups and the asymmetries between moral versus immoral judgment.

我们假设人们可以利用他们道德直觉的极端——某事物感觉道德与不道德的程度——做出功能性的社会推论，以表明内在性格、有利于个人福利、将群体联系在一起并教授规范行为。我们在四项预先注册的研究（N = 1224)。我们对这些社会功能的衡量有四个可靠的、不同的维度，分别映射到信号、受益、约束和教学（研究 1-3）。这些社会功能独特地预测了在各种道德背景下对道德和不道德的判断（研究 1），并且通过实验操纵这些社会功能的运作会导致更强的道德判断（研究 4）。至关重要的是，对道德极端的实验性操纵——参与者写下他们自己回忆的（研究 2）或假设的（研究 3）不同严重程度的道德事件——会对这些社会功能产生更强的推论。总体分析为这些假设提供了补充支持。最后，我们讨论了道德如何促进群体生活以及道德与不道德判断之间的不对称性。