Can competition law consider effects on privacy, or should privacy concerns of data-collecting behaviour only be dealt with by data protection law? In this paper, we analyse the German Facebook case, in which the requirement of giving consent to the combination of personal data from different sources was prohibited as exploitative abuse by a dominant firm. We show, from an economic perspective, that due to the simultaneous existence of two market failures (market dominance, information and behavioural problems) and complex interaction effects between both market failures and both policies in digital markets, a new, much more complex relationship emerges. Since the traditional approach of a strict separation of both policies is no longer feasible, a more integrative and collaborative policy approach for competition law and data protection law might be necessary. With respect to the substantive issue in the Facebook case, i.e. protecting a minimum standard of choice for consumers regarding their personal data vis-a-vis dominant digital platform firms, the recent decision by the German Federal Court of Justice in this case and the proposed Digital Markets Act have led to new perspectives for dealing with privacy concerns in competition law and new forms of ex-ante regulation.

竞争法是否可以考虑对隐私的影响，或者数据收集行为的隐私问题是否应仅由数据保护法处理？在本文中，我们分析了德国 Facebook 案，在该案中，要求同意合并来自不同来源的个人数据的要求被禁止作为占主导地位的公司的剥削性滥用。我们从经济学的角度表明，由于两种市场失灵（市场支配地位、信息和行为问题）同时存在，以及两种市场失灵与数字市场中两种政策之间的复杂相互作用，一种新的、更复杂的关系出现了. 由于严格分离两种策略的传统方法不再可行，可能需要对竞争法和数据保护法采取更加综合和协作的政策方法。关于 Facebook 案中的实质性问题，即保护消费者相对于主导数字平台公司的个人数据选择的最低标准，德国联邦法院最近在此案中的裁决和提议的数字市场法为处理竞争法中的隐私问题和新形式的事前监管带来了新的视角。