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Investment traps and resilience to shocks: An experimental study of Central Asian collective water governance
Irrigation and Drainage ( IF 1.6 ) Pub Date : 2022-03-16 , DOI: 10.1002/ird.2704
Iroda Amirova 1 , Martin Petrick 2, 3 , Nodir Djanibekov 3
Affiliation  

We theoretically and empirically investigate the investments of water users in a stylized local irrigation system. We model irrigation self-management as an interdependent interaction of users in an evolutionary game and study the resilience of the irrigation system. The theoretical model implies multiple stable equilibria at different efficiency levels. Users may be trapped in a low level of collective investment or succeed by being locked in a high collective investment level, implying an irrigation system resilient against external shocks. The study seeks to empirically identify such lock-ins in experimental interactions among Central Asian farmers. Furthermore, we inquire into whether a pre-play cheap talk opportunity with peer-monitoring or sanctioning treatments influence the self-reinforcing dynamic. Our findings revealed several stable states. Among these states, there are both low and high levels of efficiency, which we measure in the size of public good. Communication among users results in higher collective investment levels. However, this does not guarantee the complete elimination of inferior conventions from best-response play. Penalties crowded out the intrinsic motivation to cooperate as they reduced collective investment in both low- and high-level equilibria. Our findings imply that institutional settings tailored to each community can improve resilience to climate-driven perturbations in water resources.

中文翻译:

投资陷阱和抵御冲击的能力:中亚集体水治理的实验研究

我们从理论上和实证上调查了用水户对程式化的地方灌溉系统的投资。我们将灌溉自我管理建模为用户在进化博弈中相互依赖的交互,并研究灌溉系统的弹性。该理论模型暗示了不同效率水平下的多个稳定平衡。用户可能被困在低水平的集体投资中,或者因被锁定在高水平的集体投资中而获得成功,这意味着灌溉系统能够抵御外部冲击。该研究旨在通过经验确定中亚农民之间的实验互动中的这种锁定。此外,我们调查了带有同伴监控或制裁治疗的赛前廉价谈话机会是否会影响自我强化的动力。我们的研究结果揭示了几种稳定状态。在这些状态中,效率有低水平和高水平,我们用公共物品的规模来衡量。用户之间的交流导致更高的集体投资水平。然而,这并不能保证从最佳响应游戏中完全消除低劣的惯例。惩罚挤出了合作的内在动机,因为它们减少了对低水平和高水平均衡的集体投资。我们的研究结果表明,为每个社区量身定制的机构设置可以提高对气候驱动的水资源扰动的恢复能力。这并不能保证从最佳响应游戏中完全消除低劣的约定。惩罚挤出了合作的内在动机,因为它们减少了对低水平和高水平均衡的集体投资。我们的研究结果表明,为每个社区量身定制的机构设置可以提高对气候驱动的水资源扰动的恢复能力。这并不能保证从最佳响应游戏中完全消除低劣的约定。惩罚挤出了合作的内在动机,因为它们减少了对低水平和高水平均衡的集体投资。我们的研究结果表明,为每个社区量身定制的机构设置可以提高对气候驱动的水资源扰动的恢复能力。
更新日期:2022-03-16
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