Consideration of collectives raises important questions about human rationality. This has long been known for questions about preferences, but it holds also with respect to beliefs. For one, there are contexts (such as voting) where we might care as much, or more, about the rationality of a collective than the rationality of the individuals it comprises. Here, a given standard may yield competing assessments at the individual and the collective level, thus giving rise to important normative questions. At the same time, seemingly rational strategies of individuals may have surprising consequences, or even fail, when exercised by individuals within collectives. This paper will illustrate these considerations with examples, provide an overview of different formal frameworks for understanding and assessing the beliefs of collectives, and it will illustrate how such frameworks can combine with simulations in order to elucidate epistemic norms.

中文翻译：

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集体与认知理性


对集体的思考提出了关于人类理性的重要问题。这在偏好问题上早已众所周知，但在信仰方面也同样如此。其一，在某些情况下（例如投票），我们可能同样关心甚至更关心集体的合理性，而不是集体所组成的个人的合理性。在这里，给定的标准可能会在个人和集体层面产生相互竞争的评估，从而引发重要的规范性问题。与此同时，看似理性的个人策略在集体中的个人实施时可能会产生令人惊讶的后果，甚至失败。本文将通过示例说明这些考虑因素，概述用于理解和评估集体信念的不同正式框架，并将说明这些框架如何与模拟相结合以阐明认知规范。