Employer cofinancing in disability insurance (DI) systems aims to reduce the inflow to DI by making employers internalise their DI costs. We evaluate a cofinancing system for the local government sector in Sweden inspired by the literature on yardstick competition. In the system, local governments are responsible for the DI of their employees, while being compensated by the central government for their expected DI payments. The arrangement essentially eliminates the large fiscal externalities associated with DI. Also, the arrangement can be implemented within current administrative setups, and the design credibly ensures that no extra costs are imposed on the local government sector in the aggregate. Drawing on Swedish employer-employee matched data, we show that the net transfers implied by the scheme are quite large as a share of DI payments, but sufficiently small as a share of tax payments to not be onerous, and that they only marginally increase regional inequality.

中文翻译：

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残疾保险和地方政府雇主的联合融资模式

残疾保险 (DI) 系统中的雇主联合融资旨在通过使雇主将其 DI 成本内部化来减少对 DI 的流入。我们评估了瑞典地方政府部门的联合融资系统，其灵感来自有关标准竞争的文献。在该系统中，地方政府对其雇员的直接投资负责，而中央政府对其预期的直接投资支付进行补偿。这种安排基本上消除了与直接投资相关的巨大财政外部性。此外，该安排可以在当前的行政设置内实施，并且该设计可靠地确保了总体上不会对地方政府部门施加额外费用。根据瑞典雇主-雇员匹配数据，我们表明该计划隐含的净转移支付占 DI 支付的份额相当大，