Kant’s notion of common sense (Gemeinsinn) is crucial not only for his account of judgements of beauty, but also for the link he draws between the necessary conditions of such judgements and cognition in general. Contrary to existing interpretations which connect common sense to pleasure, I argue that it should be understood as the capacity to sense the harmony of the cognitive faculties through a sui generis sensation distinct from pleasure. This sensed harmony of the faculties is not only the ground of judgements of beauty and the basis of pleasure in the beautiful, but is also essential, I argue, for the reflecting judgements through which we acquire empirical concepts.

康德的常识概念（Gemeinsinn）不仅对于他对美的判断的解释至关重要，而且对于他在这种判断的必要条件和一般认知之间的联系也是至关重要的。与将常识与快乐联系起来的现有解释相反，我认为它应该被理解为通过不同于快乐的独特感觉来感知认知能力的和谐的能力。这种感官的和谐不仅是判断美的基础和美中愉悦的基础，而且我认为，对于我们获得经验概念的反思判断也是必不可少的。