ABSTRACT

While recognising the significance of political actors in policy transfer, research focuses more on the role of political elites than on political parties and is dominated by studies about Western democracies rather than authoritarian states. This article examines how the ruling party shapes merit-based policy transfer in authoritarian Vietnam. It finds that with the combined developmental and political motivation, the ruling party takes comprehensive control over the transfer process through their authority to initiate, navigate, and approve. The one-party structure has both facilitating and constraining effects, allowing the ruling party to adopt a selective policy transfer approach that results in meritocracy without neutral competence. The study shows the dialectical relationship between structure and agency in policy transfer. It also challenges the assumption that the separation of political and bureaucratic careers can be applicable in authoritarianism by showing that a politically neutral civil service is impossible in the context of highly politicised merit-based policy transfer.

摘要

虽然承认政治行为者在政策转移中的重要性，但研究更多地关注政治精英的作用而不是政党，并且主要是对西方民主国家而不是专制国家的研究。本文考察了执政党如何在专制的越南塑造基于绩效的政策转移。研究发现，在发展和政治动机相结合的情况下，执政党通过其发起、引导和批准的权力全面控制转移过程。一党制既有促进作用也有约束作用，允许执政党采取选择性的政策转移方式，导致没有中立能力的贤能政治。该研究表明了政策转移中结构与代理之间的辩证关系。