This article examines how disasters influence conflict dynamics in interstate rivalries. Building on insights from the disaster, rivalry, and diversionary conflict literatures, the authors argue that disasters act as political shocks that disrupt a rivalry relationship. Hostility levels in rivalries are stable over time and shift only through major shocks. While the rivalry literature suggests that some shocks may lead to peace, the authors argue that disaster shocks are more likely to be associated with increased conflict. Disasters often strain the state’s capacity to provide security for its people, while leaders who fail to prepare or respond can face domestic costs. To avoid potential removal from office, leaders have incentives to divert the public’s attention away from poor disaster response by adopting a more aggressive foreign policy. The authors hypothesize that the time between militarized disputes is shortened when pairs of states experience rapid onset disasters. However, the conditions for diversionary conflict depend on the degree of intrastate turmoil and the number of interstate rivalries, with disaster diversionary conflict happening most frequently in rivalry dyads with significant internal strife and multiple rivalries. Duration model analyses from 1900 to 2010 provide strong support for the theory and highlight the limits of disaster diplomacy in rivalry contexts. Given the increased frequency and severity of disasters globally, the findings suggest that environmental shocks are likely to increase interstate hostilities in conflict-prone regions.

本文探讨了灾难如何影响州际竞争中的冲突动态。基于对灾难、竞争和牵制性冲突文献的见解，作者认为，灾难是破坏竞争关系的政治冲击。竞争中的敌意水平随着时间的推移是稳定的，只有在重大冲击下才会发生变化。虽然竞争文献表明某些冲击可能会导致和平，但作者认为，灾难冲击更有可能与冲突加剧有关。灾害经常使国家为其人民提供安全的能力紧张，而未能做好准备或应对的领导人可能面临国内成本。为避免可能被免职，领导人有动机通过采取更积极的外交政策来转移公众的注意力，使其从糟糕的救灾反应上转移开来。作者假设当成对的国家经历快速发生的灾难时，军事争端之间的时间会缩短。然而，转移冲突的条件取决于州内动荡的程度和州际竞争的数量，灾难转移冲突最常发生在内部纷争和多重竞争的竞争对立中。从 1900 年到 2010 年的持续时间模型分析为该理论提供了强有力的支持，并强调了灾难外交在竞争环境中的局限性。鉴于全球灾害的频率和严重程度不断增加，研究结果表明，环境冲击可能会加剧冲突多发地区的州际敌对行动。