ABSTRACT

The United States and the Soviet Union concluded two sets of strategic arms limitation talks – SALT I and II – during the 1970s. Drawing on recent revisionist scholarship, this analysis assesses the success of SALT I and SALT II’s relative failure and I by framing Soviet-American strategic arms control in the 1970s as an exercise in co-operative competition, the pursuit of competitive strategies through nominally co-operative means. Whilst SALT I achieved a temporary balance between the co-operative and competitive elements of arms control, SALT II’s demise was in large part due to the fundamental contradictions at the heart of both superpowers’ use of strategic arms limitation as an instrument of co-operative competition. The analysis concludes by assessing the implications of this analysis for strategic arms control in a new era of great-power rivalry.

摘要

美国和苏联在 1970 年代结束了两组战略武器限制谈判——SALT I 和 II。借鉴最近的修正主义学术，本分析通过将 1970 年代苏美战略军备控制视为合作竞争的练习，通过名义上的合作来追求竞争战略，从而评估了 SALT I 和 SALT II 的相对失败和 I 的成功。操作手段。虽然 SALT I 在军备控制的合作和竞争要素之间取得了暂时的平衡，但 SALT II 的消亡在很大程度上是由于两个超级大国都将战略军备限制作为合作工具的核心根本矛盾竞赛。