Why do major powers attempt foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC)? This article builds on existing security theory, proposing that a major power looks for signals that a government might exit that major power’s international hierarchy and/or enter an adversary’s hierarchy. Major powers are more likely to attempt FIRC against states that signal shifting preferences. The article tests the theory on American FIRC attempts from 1947 to 1989, covert and overt, failed and successful, proposing that when a hierarchy member or neutral state engaged in economic expropriation, this signaled possible exit from the US hierarchy and/or entry into the Soviet hierarchy, making a US FIRC attempt against that state more likely. It also presents an alternative theory, that economic special interests drove US FIRC attempts. Using new data on expropriations, the article supports the security theory, as expropriations by US hierarchy members made FIRC attempts more likely, but does not support the special interests theory.

为什么大国要尝试外国强加的政权更迭（FIRC）？本文以现有的安全理论为基础，提出一个大国寻找政府可能退出该大国的国际等级和/或进入对手等级的信号。主要大国更有可能尝试 FIRC 反对显示偏好转变的国家。文章检验了 1947 年至 1989 年美国 FIRC 尝试的理论，隐蔽和公开，失败和成功，提出当一个等级制成员或中立国家进行经济剥夺时，这标志着可能退出美国等级制和/或进入苏联的等级制度，使得美国 FIRC 更有可能针对该国家进行尝试。它还提出了另一种理论，即经济特殊利益推动了美国 FIRC 的尝试。使用关于征用的新数据，