Civilian control of the military is central to the making of security policy, ensuring that civilian officials and the elected leaders that appoint them oversee and decide military affairs. This paper exposes a challenge to civilian control in the United States that originates in the disparaging attitudes military personnel hold toward civilian society. We argue that when military personnel view military culture as superior, they are more likely to view civilian political leaders as illegitimate and in turn to favor actions that undermine civilian control. We develop a typology of civilian control in which military officers can constrain, contest and limit civilian authority. Our empirical analysis provides strong and consistent evidence of the corrosive effects of military superiority on civilian control across three surveys of U.S. military personnel: the 1998-99 TISS survey of 2901 military officers, a 2014 YouGov of 275 veterans, and an original 2020 survey of 770 West Point cadets.

文职人员对军队的控制是制定安全政策的核心，确保文职官员和任命他们的民选领导人监督和决定军事事务。本文揭露了美国对平民控制的挑战，这种挑战源于军事人员对平民社会的贬低态度。我们认为，当军事人员将军事文化视为优越时，他们更有可能将文职政治领导人视为非法，进而支持破坏文官控制的行动。我们开发了一种文职控制类型学，其中军官可以约束、竞争和限制。文职当局。我们的实证分析通过对美国军事人员的三项调查提供了强有力且一致的证据，证明军事优势对文职控制的腐蚀影响：1998-99 年对 2901 名军官的 TISS 调查、2014 年 YouGov 对 275 名退伍军人的调查和 2020 年的原始调查770 名西点军校学员。