ABSTRACT

According to Milner and Goodale’s dual visual systems (DVS) theory, a division obtains between visual consciousness and motor action, in that the visual system producing conscious vision (the ventral stream) is distinct from the one guiding action (the dorsal stream). That there would be this division is often taken (by Andy Clark and others) to undermine the folk view on how consciousness and action relate. However, even if this division obtains, this leaves open the possibility that conscious ventral information is often transmitted to the unconscious dorsal stream and then used to guide action, a possibility seeming to preserve a significant role for consciousness in action. This article assesses this possibility. In course of doing so, we will review those arguments recently having been made against the DVS view on how visual consciousness and action relate (ones due to, e.g., Briscoe and Schwenkler, or Schenk and McIntosh). What we will find is that, if we properly analyze the data upon which these arguments are based, we are still left with the impression that the DVS view is largely correct; i.e., it is only rarely that visual experience guides action.

摘要

根据 Milner 和 Goodale 的双重视觉系统 (DVS) 理论，视觉意识和运动行为之间存在分歧，因为产生有意识视觉的视觉系统（腹侧流）不同于单一的引导动作（背侧流）。这种划分经常被（安迪克拉克和其他人）用来破坏民间关于意识和行动如何相关的观点。然而，即使实现了这种划分，也留下了这样一种可能性，即有意识的腹侧信息通常会传输到无意识的背侧信息流，然后用于指导行动，这种可能性似乎在行动中保持意识的重要作用。本文评估了这种可能性。在这样做的过程中，我们将回顾最近反对 DVS 关于视觉意识和行动如何相关的观点的论点（例如，Briscoe 和 Schwenkler，或 Schenk 和 McIntosh）。我们会发现，如果我们适当地分析这些论点所依据的数据，我们仍然会觉得 DVS 的观点在很大程度上是正确的；即，视觉经验很少指导行动。