Abstract

This article investigates the impact of reorganization on productivity within public-sector firms addressing the owners' composition, the board-management relationship, and the management's decision to outsource activities. Considering a large panel of 2,325 German municipally owned utilities between 2003 and 2014, firm-level productivity is estimated based on a control function approach. Contrary to public choice theory, I do not find support for the hypothesis that an increase in government owners' control over the firm, either through shares or the board's control rights, decreases productivity. Looking at reorganization invoked by the management, I find that outsourcing increases productivity, where effects are strongest for service outsourcing.

摘要

本文研究了公共部门公司的重组对生产力的影响，涉及所有者的构成、董事会与管理层的关系以及管理层外包活动的决定。考虑到 2003 年至 2014 年间由 2,325 家德国市政公用事业公司组成的大型小组，公司层面的生产率是根据控制函数方法进行估算的。与公共选择理论相反，我不认为政府所有者通过股票或董事会的控制权增加对公司的控制会降低生产率这一假设得到支持。看看管理层发起的重组，我发现外包提高了生产力，其中服务外包的效果最强。