Having argued in Part One against extensive judicial or regulatory interference with private personnel credentialing in the health care field, this Article now shifts its focus to emphasize the anticompetitive hazards inherent in credentialing as practiced by professional interests. Competitor-sponsored credentialing is shown to be a vital part of a larger cartel strategy to curb competition by standardizing personnel and services and controlling the flow of information to health care consumers. Instead of altering the conclusions reached in Part One, however, Part Two sets forth a new and hitherto unexplored agenda for antitrust enforcement, one that the authors believe will increase the quantity and quality of information available to consumers and offer a fairer competitive environment to individuals and groups disadvantaged by the denial of desirable credentials. The specific targets singled out for antitrust scrutiny are (1) the practice of "grandfathering," by which new candidates for credentials are required to meet tougher requirements than were met by existing credential holders; (2) agreements to standardize educational programs if they go beyond setting and applying accrediting standards and impair the freedom of institutions to decide independently whether to offer unaccredited training; (3) agreements by which independent certifying or accrediting bodies limit the nature or scope of competition among themselves; and (4) mergers and joint ventures in credentialing and accrediting. The legal theory supporting antitrust attacks in the latter two categories is strengthened by the apparently original insight that commercial information and opinion are themselves articles of commerce such that agreements and combinations restricting their nature and output can be characterized as restraints of trade. Among the many self-regulatory institutions in the health care field whose operation or sponsorship is called into question by the analysis herein are the leading medical specialty boards, the Liaison Committee on Medical Education, various accrediting and certifying bodies in the allied health occupations, and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.

中文翻译：

---

卫生保健人员的私人认证：反垄断视角

在第一部分中反对对医疗保健领域的私人人员资格认证进行广泛的司法或监管干预后，本文现在将重点转移到强调职业利益所实施的资格认证中固有的反竞争危害。竞争者赞助的认证被证明是更大的卡特尔战略的重要组成部分，通过标准化人员和服务以及控制向医疗保健消费者的信息流来遏制竞争。然而，第二部分并没有改变第一部分得出的结论，而是提出了一个新的、迄今为止尚未探索的反垄断执法议程，作者认为，这将增加消费者可获得的信息的数量和质量，并为因拒绝获得所需证书而处于不利地位的个人和群体提供更公平的竞争环境。反垄断审查的具体目标是（1）“祖父”的做法，要求新的证书候选人满足比现有证书持有者更严格的要求；(2) 如果教育计划超出了制定和应用认证标准并损害了机构独立决定是否提供未经认证的培训的自由，则同意将其标准化；(3) 独立的认证或认可机构之间限制竞争性质或范围的协议；（四）资质认定方面的并购和合资。支持后两类反垄断攻击的法律理论得到了明显的原始见解的加强，即商业信息和意见本身就是商业物品，因此限制其性质和产出的协议和组合可以被描述为贸易限制。在本文的分析中，医疗保健领域的许多自律机构的运作或赞助受到质疑，其中包括领先的医学专业委员会、医学教育联络委员会、各种相关医疗职业的认证和认证机构，以及医院认证联合委员会。支持后两类反垄断攻击的法律理论得到了明显的原始见解的加强，即商业信息和意见本身就是商业物品，因此限制其性质和产出的协议和组合可以被描述为贸易限制。在本文的分析中，医疗保健领域的许多自律机构的运作或赞助受到质疑，其中包括领先的医学专业委员会、医学教育联络委员会、各种相关医疗职业的认证和认证机构，以及医院认证联合委员会。支持后两类反垄断攻击的法律理论得到了明显的原始见解的加强，即商业信息和意见本身就是商业物品，因此限制其性质和产出的协议和组合可以被描述为贸易限制。在本文的分析中，医疗保健领域的许多自律机构的运作或赞助受到质疑，其中包括领先的医学专业委员会、医学教育联络委员会、各种相关医疗职业的认证和认证机构，以及医院认证联合委员会。