We analytically study the economic consequences of the disclosure of managerial compensation contracts in a setting where two firms, by designing compensation contracts for their respective managers, compete for a new investment opportunity. Each manager is privately informed about her firm's profitability from this investment. We find that the disclosure leads to firms' emphasizing short-term stock performance in their managers' contracts. This, in turn, induces managers to signal favorable private information via myopic overinvestment, which deters rival firms' investments and gains their own firms a competitive edge. Nonetheless, such strategic use of compensation contracts is absent when the contracts are not disclosed; under this regime, equilibrium contracts only focus on long-term outcomes. Moreover, while disclosure-mandate-induced managerial myopia erodes firm profits, it may benefit consumer and social welfare. Our theory illuminates the economic consequences of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) disclosure implemented in 2006.

我们分析性地研究了在两家公司通过为其各自的经理设计薪酬合同来竞争新的投资机会的情况下披露管理薪酬合同的经济后果。每个经理都被私下告知她的公司从这项投资中的盈利能力。我们发现，披露导致公司在其经理合同中强调短期股票表现。这反过来又会诱使管理者通过短视的过度投资来传递有利的私人信息，从而阻止竞争对手的投资并为自己的公司赢得竞争优势。尽管如此，当合同没有披露时，补偿合同的这种战略性使用是不存在的；在这种制度下，均衡合同只关注长期结果。而且，虽然强制披露导致的管理短视侵蚀了公司的利润，但它可能有利于消费者和社会福利。我们的理论阐明了 2006 年实施的薪酬讨论和分析 (CD&A) 披露的经济后果。