ABSTRACT

Drawing on newly collected empirical data, this article explores the complex long-term political relationship between the state and the military in Mali. It argues that post-2013 French intervention has lacked an understanding of the place of the military within state structures. This led to an approach to statebuilding premised on the false idea that Mali has historically been a weak state, with weakness defined in military terms. It challenges this understanding and provides a counterargument rooted in a historical approach. It highlights how the French focus on military strengthening post-2013 inadvertently created the conditions for the 2020 coup d’état.

摘要

本文利用新收集的经验数据，探讨了马里国家与军队之间复杂的长期政治关系。它认为，2013 年后法国的干预缺乏对军队在国家结构中的地位的理解。这导致了一种国家建设方法，其前提是马里历来是一个弱国，以军事术语定义弱点。它挑战了这种理解，并提供了一种植根于历史方法的反驳。它强调了法国在 2013 年后对加强军事力量的关注如何无意中为 2020 年的政变创造了条件。