Philosophers have recently highlighted substantial affinities between causation and grounding, which have inclined some to import the conceptual and formal resources of causal interventionism into the metaphysics of grounding. The prospect of grounding interventionism raises two important questions: What exactly are grounding interventions, and why should we think they enable knowledge of grounding? This paper approaches these questions by examining how causal interventionists have addressed (or might address) analogous questions and then comparing the available options for grounding interventionism. The paper argues that grounding interventions must be understood in worldly terms, as adding something to or deleting something from the roster of entities, or making some fact obtain or fail to obtain. It considers three bases for counterfactual assessment: imagination, structural equation models, and background theory. The paper concludes that grounding interventionism requires firmer epistemological foundations, without which the interventionist’s epistemology of grounding is incomplete and ineffectually rationalist.

中文翻译：

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扎根干预主义：概念和认识论挑战

哲学家们最近强调了因果关系和基础之间的实质性相似之处，这倾向于将因果干预主义的概念和形式资源引入基础的形而上学。扎根干预主义的前景提出了两个重要的问题：究竟什么是接地干预，以及为什么我们应该认为它们能够提供接地知识？本文通过研究因果干预主义者如何解决（或可能解决）类似问题，然后比较干预主义的可用选项来解决这些问题。该论文认为，必须以世俗的术语来理解基础干预，例如在实体名册中添加或删除某些内容，或者使某些事实获得或无法获得。它考虑了反事实评估的三个基础：想象力、结构方程模型和背景理论。该论文的结论是，为干预主义奠定基础需要更坚实的认识论基础，