Does ‘remembering that p’ entail ‘knowing that p’? The widely-accepted epistemic theory of memory (hereafter, ETM) answers affirmatively. This paper purports to reveal the tension between ETM and the prevailing anti-luck epistemology. Central to my argument is the fact that we often ‘vaguely remember’ a fact, of which one plausible interpretation is that our true memory-based beliefs formed in this way could easily have been false. Drawing on prominent theories of misremembering in philosophy of psychology (e.g. fuzzy-trace theory and simulationism), I will construct cases where the subject vaguely remembers that p while fails to meet the safety condition, which imply either that ETM is false or that safety is unnecessary for knowledge. The conclusion reached in this paper will be a conditional: if veritic epistemic luck is incompatible with knowledge, then ‘remembering that p’ does not entail ‘knowing that p’.

中文翻译：

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记忆、知识和认知运气

“记住那个p”是否意味着“知道那个p”？被广泛接受的记忆认知理论（以下简称 ETM）给出了肯定的回答。本文旨在揭示 ETM 与流行的反运气认识论之间的紧张关系。我的论点的核心是我们经常“模糊地记得”一个事实，其中一个合理的解释是，我们以这种方式形成的基于记忆的真实信念很容易是错误的。借鉴心理学哲学中著名的误记理论（例如模糊迹线理论和模拟主义），我将构建主体模糊地记住p但不满足安全条件的案例，这意味着ETM是错误的，或者是安全的。不需要知识。本文得出的结论将是有条件的：