Abstract

While many authors distinguish belief from acceptance, it seems almost universally agreed that no similar distinction can be drawn between degrees of belief, or credences, and degrees of acceptance. I challenge this assumption in this paper. Acceptance comes in degrees and acknowledging this helps to resolve problems in at least two philosophical domains. Degrees of acceptance play vital roles when we simplify our reasoning, and they ground the common ground of a conversation if we assume context probabilism, i.e., that the common ground must be represented with probability spaces rather than possible worlds.

中文翻译：

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接受度

摘要

尽管许多作者将信念与接受度区分开来，但似乎几乎普遍认为，在信念度或可信度与接受度之间没有类似的区别。我在这篇论文中挑战了这个假设。接受度来自于程度，承认这一点有助于解决至少两个哲学领域的问题。当我们简化推理时，接受程度起着至关重要的作用，如果我们假设上下文概率论，它们会成为对话的共同基础，即共同基础必须用概率空间而不是可能世界来表示。