Abstract

According to a thesis famously associated with Anscombe'sIntention, knowledge is a necessary condition of intentional action: when acting intentionally, we know what we are doing. Call this the Agential Knowledge thesis. The Agential Knowledge thesis remains, of course, controversial. Furthermore, as even some of its proponents acknowledge, it can appear puzzling: Why should acting intentionally require knowing what you are doing? My aim in this paper is to propose an explanation and defence of the Agential Knowledge thesis, based on the idea that acting intentionally is exercising control, in a relevant sense. My argument rests on two things: first, articulating a modal conception of the relevant sense of control, and, secondly, arguing that agential knowledge is distinctively practical (in a sense I explain). As I explain, the truth of the Agential Knowledge thesis opens promising paths for future work in the philosophy of action.

中文翻译：

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知识失控

摘要

根据与 Anscombe 的意图相关的著名论文，知识是有意识行动的必要条件：当有意识地行动时，我们知道自己在做什么。将此称为代理知识论文。当然，代理知识论点仍然存在争议。此外，正如它的一些支持者所承认的那样，它可能看起来令人费解：为什么故意采取行动需要知道你在做什么？我在本文中的目的是基于相关意义上的故意行为是行使控制的想法，提出对代理知识论题的解释和辩护。我的论点基于两件事：首先，阐明相关控制感的模态概念，其次，认为代理知识是独特的实用（在某种意义上我解释）。正如我所解释的，代理知识论题的真理为行动哲学的未来工作开辟了有希望的道路。