This paper shows how a niche account of the metaphysics of laws of nature and physical properties—the Powers-BSA—can underpin both a sense in which the laws are metaphysically necessary and a sense in which it is true that the laws could have been different. The ability to reconcile entrenched disagreement should count in favour of a philosophical theory, so this paper constitutes a novel argument for the Powers-BSA by showing how it can reconcile disagreement about the laws’ modal status. This paper also constitutes a defence of modal necessitarianism, the interesting and controversial view according to which all worlds are nomologically identical, because it shows how the modal necessitarian can appease the orthodox contingentist about laws.

中文翻译：

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自然法则：必要和偶然

本文展示了对自然法则和物理特性的形而上学的利基解释——Powers-BSA——如何支持一种意义上的法律在形而上学上是必要的，以及一种意义上的法律可能是不同的。 . 调和根深蒂固的分歧的能力应该算作有利于哲学理论，因此本文通过展示它如何调和关于法律模式状态的分歧，构成了 Powers-BSA 的新论点。本文还构成了对模态必然主义的辩护，这是一种有趣且有争议的观点，根据该观点，所有世界在法理上都是相同的，因为它表明模态必然主义如何在法律上安抚正统的偶然论者。