Abstract

In the article ‘Moral Testimony: A Re-Conceived Understanding Explanation’, Callahan argues that her re-conceived view of understanding can explain the issue with deference to moral testimony better than the more traditional understanding-based accounts. In this paper, I argue that Callahan fails to give a more successful explanation of the problem with moral testimony for two reasons. First, I argue that Callahan fails to adequately prove her claim that deference to testimony disincentivizes her re-conceived understanding. Second, I take issue with Callahan's claim that this re-conceived understanding is distinctly important in the moral domain. I also offer a more promising route for Callahan to take in explaining the problem with moral testimony.

中文翻译：

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道德见证和重新理解：对卡拉汉的回应

摘要

在文章“道德证词：重新构思的理解解释”中，卡拉汉认为，她重新构思的理解观点可以比更传统的基于理解的解释更好地解释这个问题，尊重道德证词。在本文中，我认为卡拉汉未能更成功地解释道德证词的问题，原因有二。首先，我认为卡拉汉未能充分证明她的说法，即对证词的尊重会抑制她重新构思的理解。其次，我不同意卡拉汉的说法，即这种重新构思的理解在道德领域非常重要。我还为卡拉汉提供了一条更有希望的途径来解释道德证词的问题。