In the Indian historiography of law and labour, master–servant regulations are an under-explored subject. Based on English precedents, these regulations acquired a specifically colonial nature when applied to control labour in the growing city of Calcutta. Questioning the assumed associations of domestic servants with privacy and informality, this article shows that in fact they were unambiguously one of the earliest groups to be regulated. It approaches the law from both ends, from its formal promulgation to its actual implementation. It analyses various regulations from 1759 to the 1810s that were passed to control employment relations between masters and servants, while for the first time analysing three different sets of court records to reconstruct the history of justice and the enforcement of law. It argues that domestic servants engaged with the law strategically: they made complaints of the non-payment of wages against their Indian masters but never brought such charges against their European masters. This absence is better understood if we unpack the hidden histories behind the juristic terms of these complaints, such as neglect of duty, running away (with or without advance payment of wages), demand for exorbitant wages, and theft, and see them as interlinked modes of control exercised under the master–servant regulations.

中文翻译：

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1750 年代至 1810 年代殖民地加尔各答的家庭仆人和主仆条例

在印度的法律和劳动史学中，主仆规则是一个未被充分探索的主题。根据英国的先例，这些法规在用于控制不断发展的加尔各答市的劳动力时具有特殊的殖民性质。本文质疑家庭佣工与隐私和非正式性的假设关联，表明事实上，他们无疑是最早受到监管的群体之一。它从法律的正式颁布到实际实施，从两个方面着手。它分析了从 1759 年到 1810 年代通过的各种控制主仆之间雇佣关系的法规，同时首次分析了三组不同的法庭记录，以重建司法和执法的历史。它争辩说，家庭佣工战略性地参与了法律：他们抱怨他们的印度主人不支付工资，但从未对他们的欧洲主人提出过此类指控。如果我们解开这些投诉的法律术语背后的隐藏历史，例如玩忽职守、逃跑（有或没有预付工资）、要求过高的工资和盗窃，并把它们视为相互关联的，这种缺席就会更好地理解。根据主仆规则实施的控制方式。