Freud is often negatively contrasted with object relations and relational theorists for holding to a metapsychology in which drives are understood as innate and predetermined in their development, are thought to follow the pleasure principle in a “hydraulic” manner, and are not seen as influenced by real objects. While that theory is certainly one dimension of Freud’s thinking, it is paralleled by another, quite different model positing a “mirror” relation in which affectively charged reversible self-object dyads, as opposed to purely internal dynamics, are the constituent elements of mental life. This view, more compatible with theories placing greater emphasis on the constitutive role of self-object relations, may further the reconciliation of Freudian and object-relational theories.

弗洛伊德经常与客体关系和关系理论家形成负面对比，因为他们坚持一种元心理学，其中驱动力被理解为与生俱来并在其发展过程中被预先确定，被认为以“液压”的方式遵循快乐原则，并且不受真实的物体。虽然该理论当然是弗洛伊德思想的一个维度，但它与另一种完全不同的模型平行，该模型假设了一种“镜像”关系，在这种关系中，与纯粹的内部动力学相反，带有情感的可逆自体对象二元组是心理生活的组成要素. 这种观点与更加强调自体-客体关系的构成作用的理论更加兼容，可能会进一步协调弗洛伊德和客体-关系理论。