We built a game-theoretic supply model where forest landowners respond to each other's decisions using two market assumptions: (i) Perfect cartel, (ii) Cournot competition (simultaneous moves) and (iii) Stackelberg competition (sequential moves). Our findings indicate that the initial forest structure is instrumental in determining forest composition outcomes among suppliers. The solutions in the Cournot model, landowners with the same initial forest structure have uniform outcomes with increased variation in financial performance arising with different initial endowments of pulpwood and sawtimber and establishment costs. Alternatively, Stackelberg leadership has profound financial benefits to leaders even under similar initial conditions, that remain regardless of scenario. However, while terminal overall forest composition was similar regardless of scenario under Cournot outcomes, the same is not true under Stackelberg. We find that Stackelberg outcomes led to the follower being unable to harvest younger age classes over time, which resulted in accumulation of older age class stands. Our results elucidate the importance of diversification and policies that reduce landownership land concentration.

我们建立了一个博弈论供应模型，其中林地所有者使用两个市场假设来回应彼此的决定：（i）完美卡特尔，（ii）古诺竞争（同时移动）和（iii）斯塔克伯格竞争（顺序移动）。我们的研究结果表明，初始森林结构有助于确定供应商之间的森林构成结果。古诺模型中的解决方案，具有相同初始森林结构的土地所有者具有一致的结果，随着纸浆木和锯材的初始禀赋和建立成本不同而导致财务业绩的差异增加。或者，即使在类似的初始条件下，斯塔克尔伯格的领导力也能为领导者带来巨大的经济利益，无论情景如何。然而，虽然无论在古诺结果下的情景如何，终端的整体森林组成都是相似的，但在斯塔克尔伯格的情况下情况并非如此。我们发现 Stackelberg 的结果导致追随者随着时间的推移无法收获更年轻的班级，这导致了年龄更大的班级的积累。我们的结果阐明了多样化和降低土地所有权土地集中度的政策的重要性。