ABSTRACT

On 12 November 2019 Baha Abu al-Ata, a leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza was targeted assassinated by Israel. Intelligence was the driver of the operation – information and data were the components of intelligence gathering enabling informed decision-making via defence and security analysis. There was effective co-ordination and co-operation between the civilian government, the Israel Defense Force’s Units Skylark, Moran, 504, 8200 and 9900, and the Israel Security Agency. Policy and technicalities were integrated through civil–military relations. The methodology used six sets of different types of intelligence gathering, analysis and risk assessment that were separate yet simultaneously were asking: why, who, when, where, how (what weapon), and assessing repercussions.

摘要

2019 年 11 月 12 日，加沙地带巴勒斯坦伊斯兰圣战组织的领导人 Baha Abu al-Ata 遭到以色列的暗杀。情报是行动的驱动力——信息和数据是情报收集的组成部分，能够通过防御和安全分析做出明智的决策。文职政府、以色列国防军的云雀、莫兰、504、8200 和 9900 部队以及以色列安全局之间进行了有效的协调与合作。通过军民关系整合了政策和技术细节。该方法使用了六组不同类型的情报收集、分析和风险评估，这些情报收集、分析和风险评估是分开的，但同时也在询问：为什么、谁、何时、何地、如何（什么武器）以及评估影响。