This paper examines the effects of foreign visits by public officials on international trade. Using an original database that gathers more than 13,000 visits of French officials abroad and of foreign officials in France over the 1977–2007 period, it is shown that a bilateral visit to a foreign country is associated with an increase in French exports by 8% on average. This average effect hides considerable heterogeneity across world regions. The paper provides some evidence on the underlying mechanisms and finds that face-to-face visits mitigate trade costs related to contractual enforcement, insecurity and information. Indeed, analysis at the sectoral level reveals that visits increase French exports of a large variety of products, but that their effect is larger for differentiated products, i.e., goods highly exposed to contractual risks. Furthermore, bilateral visits reinforce trade, particularly in countries characterized by weak contract enforcement, corruption and lower political proximity with France, as well as by a smaller number of French migrants.

本文考察了公职人员出访对国际贸易的影响。使用一个原始数据库，该数据库收集了 1977 年至 2007 年期间法国官员和外国官员在法国的 13,000 多次访问，结果表明，对外国的双边访问与法国出口增长 8% 相关平均。这种平均效应隐藏了世界各地相当大的异质性。该论文提供了一些关于基本机制的证据，并发现面对面访问可以降低与合同执行、不安全和信息相关的贸易成本。事实上，部门层面的分析表明，访问增加了法国多种产品的出口，但对于差异化产品（即高度暴露于合同风险的商品）的影响更大。