In our day-to-day lives, we form responsibility judgements about one another – but we are imperfect beings, and our judgments can be mistaken. This paper suggests that we get things wrong not merely by chance, but predictably and systematically. In particular, these miscues are common when we are dealing with large gaps in social status and power. That is, when we form judgements about those who are much more or less socially powerful than ourselves, it is increasingly likely that “epistemic distorters” will reliably disrupt our reasoning. In response to this situation, I argue for the introduction of a new norm concerning blame and social status: “Powerful Restraint.” This norm suggests that the socially powerful ought to blame the socially dispossessed less frequently, and that social pressure be applied to achieve that compliance. I argue that such a norm is justified given the pernicious down-stream moral effects of the up-stream epistemic distortion I describe. I defend it against objections that it suggests a normative solution to an epistemic problem, that it is paternalistic, and that it involves a kind of disrespect to the less socially powerful.

在我们的日常生活中，我们对彼此形成责任判断——但我们是不完美的人，我们的判断可能会出错。这篇论文表明，我们做错事不仅是偶然的，而且是可以预见的和系统的。特别是，当我们处理社会地位和权力的巨大差距时，这些失误很常见。也就是说，当我们对那些在社会上或多或少比我们强大的人形成判断时，“认知扭曲者”很可能会可靠地破坏我们的推理。针对这种情况，我主张引入关于责备和社会地位的新规范：“强有力的克制”。这一规范表明，社会有权势者应该不那么频繁地责怪被社会剥夺的人，并施加社会压力来实现这种顺从。我认为，鉴于我所描述的上游认知扭曲对下游的有害道德影响，这种规范是合理的。我为它辩护，反对反对意见认为它提出了对认知问题的规范解决方案，它是家长式的，并且它涉及对社会权力较弱的人的一种不尊重。