We analyze a model in which a firm’s manager privately learns about the expected return on the firm’s project and strategically discloses it to investors (i.e., discretionary disclosure). Based on the manager’s disclosure, investors decide whether to withdraw their investments from the firm. Our analysis indicates that investors’ optimistic prior beliefs in the firm reduce the possibility of their withdrawals and the manager’s incentive of discretionary disclosure, whereas pessimistic beliefs increase them. We further examine the effects of a commitment to reporting of bad news, namely, the conservative disclosure rule. This rule always suppresses the manager’s incentive of discretionary disclosure; however, it increases (reduces) investors’ withdrawals when they are optimistic (pessimistic) about the firm’s project.

我们分析了一个模型，其中公司经理私下了解公司项目的预期回报并战略性地向投资者披露（即酌情披露）。根据经理的披露，投资者决定是否从公司撤回投资。我们的分析表明，投资者对公司的乐观先前信念降低了他们退出的可能性和经理自由裁量披露的动机，而悲观信念增加了它们。我们进一步研究了承诺报告坏消息的影响，即保守披露规则。这条规则总是抑制经理自由裁量披露的动机；然而，当投资者对公司的项目持乐观（悲观）态度时，它会增加（减少）投资者的撤资。