Although top management teams use their human capital, social capital, and cognition (i.e., dynamic managerial capabilities) to drive strategic change in their firms, faultlines within these teams may dampen the strategic change that they produce. While boards can enable but also restrict these change efforts, we know little about how precisely a board's monitoring and advice-giving condition the impact of the top management team's dynamic managerial capabilities on strategic change. We clarify how intense monitoring and advice-giving affect strategic change when faultlines between the top management team's and board's dynamic managerial capabilities are more or less salient. We explain that intense monitoring further stifles both the breadth and speed of strategic change that can be accomplished, and that this is more pronounced when the faultlines between the two bodies are strong. Furthermore, we outline that intensive advice-giving can be beneficial in improving the breadth of strategic change, but more so when these faultlines are weak and less so when they are strong. Notably we illuminate that the reverse happens in terms of speed of strategic change: intensive advice-giving can be detrimental engendering a further dampening of strategic change speed which is more pronounced when these faultlines are strong but less when they are weak.

尽管高层管理团队利用他们的人力资本、社会资本和认知（即动态管理能力）来推动公司的战略变革，但这些团队内部的断层线可能会抑制他们产生的战略变革。虽然董事会可以促成也可以限制这些变革努力，但我们对董事会的监督和建议提供条件如何精确地影响高层管理团队的动态管理能力对战略变革的影响知之甚少。我们阐明了当高层管理团队和董事会的动态管理能力之间的分歧或多或少突出时，密集的监控和建议如何影响战略变革。我们解释说，密集的监控进一步扼杀了可以实现的战略变革的广度和速度，当两个物体之间的断层线很坚固时，这种情况会更加明显。此外，我们概述了密集的建议提供有助于提高战略变革的广度，但当这些断层线较弱时更是如此，而当它们很强大时则更是如此。值得注意的是，我们阐明了战略变革的速度发生了相反的情况：密集的建议提供可能是有害的，导致战略变革速度的进一步下降，当这些断层线很强时更为明显，而当它们较弱时则较少。