The UK has had a commitment to loan guarantee schemes since 1981 when it introduced the Small Firms Loan Guarantee (SFLG) scheme to address access to debt finance issues for smaller firms. Over the last 40 years, its support has been unwavering, and in the Covid-19 crisis, it once again turned to loan guarantees as a means of supporting smaller firms through the crisis-induced slump in trading activities. Of its three core Covid-19 guarantee schemes, the Bounce Back Loan (BBL) scheme was the most numerous with 1,531,095 loans issued amounting to a total of £46.5bn in lending. The BBL scheme provided a 100% capital guarantee on loans between £2,000 and £50,000, and firms were allowed to borrow up to 25% of their trading income, with a fixed interest rate of 2.5% of which the first years interest was paid by the government to the lending bank. Our findings suggest that the government losses may range between £7bn and £12bn depending on the underlying assumptions; however, we estimate Covid-19 guarantee schemes may have protected 118,639 businesses and 1,117,849 jobs. Looking to the future, we suggest that a new loan guarantee is justified that more resembles the former SFLG than the restrictive Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG) as more than one million small businesses will be heavily indebted and unable to borrow to invest in future growth opportunities. This would support the ‘levelling-up’ agenda and help prevent a post-Covid-19 low investment–low growth scenario.

自 1981 年英国推出小企业贷款担保 (SFLG) 计划以解决小企业获得债务融资问题以来，英国就承诺实施贷款担保计划。在过去的 40 年中，它的支持一直坚定不移，在 Covid-19 危机中，它再次转向贷款担保，作为支持小公司度过危机引发的贸易活动下滑的一种手段。在其三个核心 Covid-19 担保计划中，反弹贷款 (BBL) 计划是数量最多的，共发放了 1,531,095 笔贷款，贷款总额为 465 亿英镑。BBL 计划为 2,000 至 50,000 英镑之间的贷款提供 100% 的资本担保，允许公司以 2.5% 的固定利率借入其交易收入的 25%，其中第一年的利息由政府向贷款银行。我们的研究结果表明，政府损失可能在 70 亿至 120 亿英镑之间，具体取决于基本假设；但是，我们估计 Covid-19 担保计划可能保护了 118,639 家企业和 1,117,849 个工作岗位。展望未来，我们建议新的贷款担保比限制性企业融资担保 (EFG) 更类似于以前的 SFLG，因为超过 100 万小企业将负债累累，无法借贷以投资未来的增长机会. 这将支持“升级”议程，并有助于防止出现 Covid-19 后的低投资低增长情景。展望未来，我们建议新的贷款担保比限制性企业融资担保 (EFG) 更类似于以前的 SFLG，因为超过 100 万小企业将负债累累，无法借贷以投资未来的增长机会. 这将支持“升级”议程，并有助于防止出现 Covid-19 后的低投资低增长情景。展望未来，我们建议新的贷款担保比限制性企业融资担保 (EFG) 更类似于以前的 SFLG，因为超过 100 万小企业将负债累累，无法借贷以投资未来的增长机会. 这将支持“升级”议程，并有助于防止出现 Covid-19 后的低投资低增长情景。