This paper reveals a serious flaw in the consequentialist solution to the inefficacy problem in moral philosophy. The consequentialist solution is based on expected utility theory. In current philosophical literature, the debate focuses on the empirical plausibility of the solution. Most philosophers consider the cases of collective actions as of the same type as a horse-racing game, where expected utility theory is adequate to solve the choice problem. However, these cases should be considered as of the same type as a coordination game, where the assumption of common knowledge is also required. However, the assumption is implausible—it is impossible to obtain common knowledge of rationality in cases such as voting.

本文揭示了结果论解决道德哲学无效问题的一个严重缺陷。结果主义解决方案基于预期效用理论。在当前的哲学文献中，争论的焦点是解决方案的经验合理性。大多数哲学家将集体行动的情况视为与赛马游戏相同的类型，其中预期效用理论足以解决选择问题。但是，这些情况应被视为与协调博弈相同的类型，其中也需要假设常识。然而，这个假设是不可信的——在投票等案例中，不可能获得关于理性的常识。