The increasing development of resistant pathogens is one of the greatest global health challenges. As antibiotic overuse amplifies antibiotic resistance, antibiotic intake poses a social dilemma in which individuals need to decide whether to prosocially reduce their intake in the collective interest versus to (over)use it even in case of mild diseases. We devise a novel behavioral game paradigm to model the social dilemma of antibiotic intake. Using this new method in an incentivized laboratory experiment (N = 272 German participants), we varied whether players had mutual knowledge about their antibiotic intake. The results indicate that there was substantial antibiotic overuse in the absence of social information. Overuse decreased when social information was present. Our postexperimental survey data further suggest that social information impacts people's behavioral motivation, evaluation of the other player, and positive affect. Taken together, providing social information about people's antibiotic intake may help in reducing antibiotic overuse. On a more general level, the novel behavioral game may be adapted to study other aspects of antibiotic intake to promote prudent use of antibiotics.

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抗生素耐药性的行为决定因素：社会信息的作用

耐药病原体的日益发展是全球最大的健康挑战之一。由于抗生素过度使用会放大抗生素耐药性，抗生素的摄入造成了一个社会困境，个人需要决定是为了集体利益而亲社会地减少摄入量，还是在轻微疾病的情况下（过度）使用抗生素。我们设计了一种新颖的行为博弈范式来模拟抗生素摄入的社会困境。在激励实验室实验中使用这种新方法（N = 272 名德国参与者），我们改变了玩家是否相互了解他们的抗生素摄入量。结果表明，在缺乏社会信息的情况下存在大量抗生素过度使用。当存在社会信息时，过度使用会减少。我们的实验后调查数据进一步表明，社会信息会影响人们的行为动机、对其他参与者的评价和积极影响。总之，提供有关人们抗生素摄入量的社会信息可能有助于减少抗生素的过度使用。在更一般的层面上，新的行为游戏可能适用于研究抗生素摄入的其他方面，以促进谨慎使用抗生素。