Kant’s general mode of argument in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, especially his defence of human nature’s propensity to evil, is a matter of considerable controversy: while some interpret his argument as strictly a priori, others interpret it as anthropological. In dialogue with Allen Wood’s recent work, I defend my earlier claim that Religion employs a quasi-transcendental mode of argument, focused on the possibility of a specific type of experience, not experience in general. In Religion, Kant portrays religious experience as possible only for beings with a good predisposition and a propensity to evil. Kant’s theory of the archetype and his theory of symbolism illustrate the same mode of argument. Taking Religion as a sequel to the third Critique more than the second, my perspectival interpretation makes room for a robust view of unsociable sociability without the absurd deception of regarding it as the source of human evil.

康德在《纯粹理性范围内的宗教》一书中的一般论证方式，尤其是他对人性邪恶倾向的辩护，是一个颇具争议的问题：虽然有些人将他的论证严格地解释为先验的，但其他人则将其解释为人类学的。在与艾伦伍德最近的作品的对话中，我为我之前的主张辩护，即宗教采用了一种准先验的论证模式，专注于特定类型经验的可能性，而不是一般经验。在《宗教》中，康德描绘了宗教只有具有良好倾向和邪恶倾向的人才能体验。康德的原型理论和他的象征理论说明了相同的论证模式。将宗教视为第三次批判的续集，而不是第二次，我的透视解释为不善于社交的社会性的强有力观点提供了空间，而没有将其视为人类邪恶之源的荒谬欺骗。