Abstract

The literature on indicative conditionals contains two appealing views. The first is the selectional view: on this view, conditionals operate by selecting a single possibility, which is used to evaluate the consequent. The second is the informational view: on this view, conditionals don’t express propositions, but rather impose constraints on information states of speakers. Both views are supported by strong arguments, but they are incompatible on their standard formulations. Hence it appears that we have to choose between mutually exclusive options. But the options are not exclusive. This paper develops a theory of the semantics and assertability of conditionals that is both selectional and informational. The theory vindicates the signature inferences of both selectional and informational theories, including so-called Conditionals Excluded Middle and principles about the interplay between conditionals and ‘might’. It also predicts some interesting and puzzling facts about the assertion of conditionals.

中文翻译：

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指示条件的路径语义

摘要

关于指示性条件句的文献包含两个吸引人的观点。第一个是选择视图：在此视图中，条件句通过选择单个可能性来操作，该可能性用于评估结果。二是信息观：在这种观点下，条件句不表达命题，而是对说话者的信息状态施加约束。这两种观点都得到了强有力的论据的支持，但它们在标准表述上是不相容的。因此，我们似乎必须在相互排斥的选项之间进行选择。但这些选项并非排他性的。本文发展了一种关于条件句的语义和可断言性的理论，它既是选择性的又是信息性的。该理论证明了选择理论和信息理论的标志性推论是正确的，包括所谓的条件句排除中间和关于条件句和“可能”之间相互作用的原则。它还预测了一些关于条件断言的有趣和令人费解的事实。