Consciousness has an important role in ethics: when a being consciously experiences the frustration or satisfaction of its interests, those interests deserve higher moral priority than those of a behaviourally similar but non-conscious being. I consider the relationship between this ethical role and an a posteriori (or ‘type-B’) materialist solution to the mind-body problem. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, if type-B materialism is correct, then the reference of the concept Phenomenal Consciousness is radically indeterminate between a neuronal-level property that is distinctive to mammals and a high-level functional property that is much more widely shared. This would leave many non-mammalian animals (such as birds, fish, insects and octopuses) with indeterminate moral status. There are ways to manage this radical moral indeterminacy, but all of these ways lead to profoundly troubling consequences.

中文翻译：

---

唯物主义与动物的道德地位

意识在伦理学中起着重要的作用：当一个人有意识地经历其利益的挫折或满足时，这些利益比行为相似但无意识的人的利益更值得道德优先。我考虑了这种道德角色与身心问题的后验（或“B型”）唯物主义解决方案之间的关系。很难避免这样的结论，如果 B 型唯物主义是正确的，那么现象意识概念的参考在哺乳动物特有的神经元水平属性和更高级的功能属性之间是完全不确定的。广泛分享。这将使许多非哺乳动物（如鸟类、鱼类、昆虫和章鱼）的道德地位不确定。有办法管理这种激进的道德不确定性，