Recent work finds evidence that partisan calculations, not ideological preferences, drive congressional decisions on foreign policy. While legislators support the wars launched by their party’s presidents, they often oppose those by the other party’s presidents. However, it is unclear whether such partisan calculations are limited to a narrow set of security votes or whether they are part of a broad pattern of foreign policymaking in Congress. To examine the importance of partisan versus ideological motivations, we examine the substantive contributions legislators make to, and the votes they cast on, foreign policy measures. Specifically, we collect sponsorship and voting data on amendments that allow Congress to restrict presidential spending on defense programs and foreign aid. In analyzing data from 1971 to 2016, we find that ideology is the most consistent factor that determines whether legislators propose and support spending limits on security-related bills.

最近的工作发现证据表明，党派的计算，而不是意识形态偏好，推动了国会对外交政策的决定。虽然立法者支持本党总统发动的战争，但他们往往反对对方总统发动的战争。然而，尚不清楚这种党派计算是否仅限于少数安全投票，或者它们是否是国会外交政策制定的广泛模式的一部分。为了检验党派动机与意识形态动机的重要性，我们检验了立法者对外交政策措施的实质性贡献以及他们对外交政策措施的投票。具体来说，我们收集有关允许国会限制总统在国防计划和外援上的开支的修正案的赞助和投票数据。在分析 1971 年至 2016 年的数据时，