The U.S. criminal-justice system has consequentialist and retributivist goals: It considers what is best for society as well as how to punish people in a manner proportional to their crimes. In deciding on the degree of retribution that is called for, the system attempts to determine the blameworthiness—or culpability—of the people involved, weighing factors such as their ability to think rationality, their freedom from coercion, and whether their actions were out of character. These determinations hinge on social-scientific research that is not strong enough to justify such decisions. In this article, I challenge the social-scientific basis for determining culpability on three grounds: replicability, generalizability, and inferential strength. In light of the limitations of this research, I argue that the criminal-justice system should abandon its retributive goals and pursue a more consequentialist—and more reparative—form of justice.

美国刑事司法系统有后果主义和报应主义的目标：它考虑什么对社会最有利，以及如何以与犯罪成正比的方式惩罚人们。在决定所要求的报应程度时，系统试图确定所涉人员的应受责备（或罪责），权衡因素，例如他们的理性思考能力、他们免于胁迫的自由以及他们的行为是否不合时宜。特点。这些决定取决于社会科学研究，而这些研究不足以证明这些决定是合理的。在本文中，我从三个方面挑战确定罪责的社会科学基础：可复制性、普遍性和推理强度。鉴于本研究的局限性，