ABSTRACT

This paper investigates which factors affect revenue over-budgeting in the local government, considering budgetary, political, and institutional determinants. It applies dynamic panels analysis to data from Portuguese municipalities between 2005 and 2017. Regarding budgetary arrangements, over-budgeting has implications for several years, taking up to three years to dissipate. The difference between budgeted revenues and the ones collected in the previous year is a good predictor that revenue is overestimated. The ratio of own-source over total revenue is directly related with over-budgeting; however, this effect comes from the municipality’s wealth. About political factors, municipal Executives with political majorities and in electoral years are more prone to over-budget; however, ideology does not seem to be important. As for institutional arrangements, participation in any debt restructuring program is inversely related to over-budgeting, while excessive debt does not seem to play any role. Overall, the only mechanism which reduces over-budgeting misbehavior is external control.

摘要

本文研究了哪些因素影响地方政府收入预算超支，考虑了预算、政治和制度决定因素。它将动态面板分析应用于葡萄牙各城市2005年至2017年的数据。在预算安排方面，预算超支会产生数年的影响，最多需要三年时间才能消散。预算收入与上一年收取的收入之间的差异可以很好地预测收入是否被高估。自有收入占总收入的比例与预算超支直接相关；然而，这种影响来自于市政府的财富。关于政治因素，在政治上占多数的市政行政人员和选举年更容易出现预算超支的情况；然而，意识形态似乎并不重要。就制度安排而言，参与任何债务重组计划都与预算超额成反比，而过多的债务似乎并没有发挥任何作用。总体而言，减少过度预算不当行为的唯一机制是外部控制。