ABSTRACT

Dictators rely on coercive forces to remain in office, as violence is the ultimate arbiter of power in these regimes. However, coercive forces also can remove the dictator from office in a coup. This presents the dictator with a dilemma. One way to address this dilemma is to personalize the security forces. This paper argues that personalizing the security forces decreases coup risk by: (a) linking the security elites’ fate more closely to the leader’s and (b) increasing the informational advantage the leader has over security elites. Using a new measure of the personalization of security apparatus, I show that personalization decreases coup risk in dictatorships, but this stabilizing effect of personalization disappears after the dictator’s exit from office. This study documents how dictators transform the security apparatus to stabilize their rule, with implications for how dictatorships survive and collapse.

摘要

独裁者依靠强制力量继续执政，因为暴力是这些政权中权力的最终仲裁者。然而，强制力量也可以在政变中将独裁者赶下台。这给独裁者带来了两难境地。解决这一困境的一种方法是个性化安全部队。本文认为，个性化安全部队通过以下方式降低政变风险：(a) 将安全精英的命运与领导者的命运更紧密地联系起来；(b) 增加领导者相对于安全精英的信息优势。使用安全设备个性化的新度量，我表明个性化降低了独裁政权的政变风险，但这种个性化的稳定效应在独裁者下台后消失了。