Families produce people. This presents a problem for autocratic regimes. On the one hand, familial production benefits the autocrat by augmenting the future productivity of the labor force. On the other hand, familial production threatens the autocrat by drawing current resources and loyalty away from the collective. This paper presents a theory of autocratic family policy in which the deciding factor is how much present control over resources an autocrat is willing to forego for future control. I apply this theory to the Soviet Union, arguing that the somersault of Soviet family policies (1917–1944) was a response to this tradeoff under different conditions.

中文翻译：

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专制家庭政策

家庭产生人。这给专制政权带来了问题。一方面，家庭生产通过提高劳动力未来的生产力使独裁者受益。另一方面，家庭生产通过从集体中抽走现有资源和忠诚度来威胁独裁者。本文提出了一种独裁家庭政策理论，其中决定因素是独裁者愿意为未来的控制放弃多少目前对资源的控制。我将这一理论应用于苏联，认为苏联家庭政策的翻筋斗（1917-1944 年）是对不同条件下这种权衡的回应。