An ‘elite’ party caters to ‘elite’ voters, while a ‘non-elite’ party caters to ‘non-elite’ voters. Now, the ‘elite’ party wants to expand its support base to include ‘non-elite’ voters. It can do so using one of two possible strategies—it can provide them public goods or it can dole out clientelistic benefits to them. We present a probabilistic voting model to study the conditions under which the ‘elite’ party is likely to choose one or the other strategy. Our findings are supported by several historical and contemporary political experiences like that of the BJP in India, and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated parties in Egypt, Yemen, and Indonesia.

“精英”政党迎合“精英”选民，而“非精英”政党迎合“非精英”选民。现在，“精英”党希望扩大其支持基础，以包括“非精英”选民。它可以使用两种可能的策略之一来做到这一点——它可以为他们提供公共产品，或者它可以为他们提供客户利益。我们提出了一个概率投票模型来研究“精英”政党可能选择一种或另一种策略的条件。我们的研究结果得到了一些历史和当代政治经验的支持，例如印度人民党的经验，以及埃及、也门和印度尼西亚的穆斯林兄弟会附属政党。