The Argumentative Adversariality debate is over the question of whether argument must be adversarial. A particular locus of this debate is on skeptical challenges in critical dialogue. The Default Skeptical Stance (DSS) in argument is a practical manifestation of argumentative adversariality. Views about the on-the-ground value of the DSS vary. On one hand, in “The Social & Political Limitations of Philosophy” (2012), Phyllis Rooney argues that the DSS leads to epistemic injustice. On the other, Allan Hazlett in his recent piece “Critical Injustice” (2020) argues for the virtues of the skeptical stance in terms of epistemic justice. Both Rooney and Hazlett are concerned with the role skeptical engagement plays in argument, but they assign opposite values to it. In this essay, I review Rooney and Hazlett’s examples and (i) show that the epistemic dysfunction in the two scholar’s going cases is one and the same, and (ii) argue that the cause of both is a lack of proper skeptical engagement. Skeptical engagement is a requirement for epistemic justice. Together (i) and (ii) constitute an initial defense of the Adversarialist position against objections regarding the social epistemic risk of the skeptical stance.

争论的对抗性辩论是关于争论是否必须是对抗性的问题。这场辩论的一个特殊焦点是批判性对话中的怀疑挑战。辩论中的默认怀疑立场（DSS）是辩论对抗性的实际表现。关于 DSS 的实际价值的看法各不相同。一方面，在“哲学的社会和政治局限”（2012 年）中，Phyllis Rooney 认为 DSS 会导致认知上的不公正。另一方面，Allan Hazlett 在他最近的作品“Critical Injustice”（2020 年）中论证了怀疑主义立场在认知正义方面的优点。鲁尼和黑兹利特都关心怀疑论参与在争论中所起的作用，但他们赋予了相反的价值。在这篇论文中，持怀疑态度的参与是认知正义的必要条件。(i) 和 (ii) 一起构成了对抗主义立场的初步辩护，反对关于怀疑立场的社会认知风险的反对意见。